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Abstract
Going to college has long been assumed to liberalize students’ religious beliefs. Using
longitudinal data from the National Survey of Youth and Religion, we compare change in the
content of religious beliefs of those who do and do not attend college. We find that, in general,
college students are no more likely to develop liberal religious beliefs than nonstudents. In some
cases, collegians actually appear more likely to retain their initial beliefs. Change in religious
beliefs appears instead to be more strongly associated with network effects. These findings
indicate that college’s effect on students’ religious beliefs is both weak and fragmented, and
suggest that the multiplicity of social worlds on college campuses may help to sustain religious
beliefs as well as religious practice and commitment.
Social scientists have become increasingly interested in the relationship between religion
and higher education in recent years (Calhoun et al. 2007). While college has long been
thought to undermine religious belief and practice, recent studies have challenged this view,
demonstrating that college is not the “faith-killer” it was once thought to be, and that college
may actually sustain students’ religious commitments (e.g., Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler
2007).
Yet while these newer studies have shown that college does not necessarily lead to
decreased religious participation or commitment, they have not examined how college may
affect students’ religious beliefs. In fact, the matter is the subject of an ongoing and
unresolved debate. Some scholars, situated in a long line of higher education research
(Feldman and Newcomb 1969; Pascarella and Terenzini 1991, 2005), have argued that while
college may not lead students to fall from the faith, it may lead the content of their beliefs to
shift in a more liberal direction. Others, however, have asserted that college has hardly any
impact on students’ beliefs, and that young adults put their religious commitments in an
“identity lockbox” during the college years (Clydesdale 2007). As one recent review of the
literature explained, “the question is now less about whether students’ religious
commitments are maintained or abandoned, and more about whether they are ignored or
reconstituted during the college years” (Mayrl and Oeur 2009:265).
This paper contributes to the resolution of that debate. By using a nationally representative,
longitudinal sample of young adults; fine-grained measures of religious belief; and an
*The National Study of Youth and Religion, http://www.youthandreligion.org, whose data were used by permission here, was
generously funded by Lilly Endowment Inc., under the direction of Christian Smith, of the Department of Sociology at the University
of Notre Dame. We would like to thank Arne Kalleberg and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.




Soc Forces. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2012 September 10.
Published in final edited form as:













explicit comparison between those who have attended college and those who have not, we
examine whether any liberalization in religious beliefs is attributable to college. We find
that, on balance, attending college has little effect on whether young adults’ religious beliefs
become more liberal. On some dimensions, in fact, non-attenders actually appear more
likely to adopt liberal beliefs than those who attend college. These findings cast considerable
doubt on the conventional wisdom that college itself liberalizes students’ religious beliefs,
and point to the importance of network dynamics in sustaining traditional religious beliefs.
PAST RESEARCH ON RELIGION AND HIGHER EDUCATION
Is College a Liberalizing or a Negligible Influence?
Conventional scholarly wisdom has long held that higher education liberalizes students’
beliefs (Feldman and Newcomb 1969). A prominent survey on how college affects students
concluded that one major effect was that students’ “[r]eligious beliefs become more
individual and less doctrinaire, and tolerance for the religious views of others appears to
increase” (Pascarella and Terenzini 1991:326). The argument that college liberalizes
religious beliefs has even served as the foundation for trenchant analyses of American
society; Wuthnow (1988) made the differences in religious belief that flowed from the
“education gap” a key part of his explanation of the “restructuring” of American religion
into liberal and conservative camps.
In recent years, many scholars have continued to find that students’ religious beliefs tend to
become more liberal and less orthodox. Qualitative studies often find that the college
experience reduces religious orthodoxy and promotes individualistic beliefs (Cherry,
DeBerg, and Porterfield 2001; Cole and Ahmadi 2003; Lee 2002a). Some quantitative
studies have found similar liberalizing effects. Among college students, Astin, Astin, and
Lindholm’s (2011) longitudinal study found that most indicators of religious conservatism
declined over the college years. Studies using the General Social Survey or other national
samples have found that higher levels of education are negatively associated with biblical
literalism (Petersen 1994; Sherkat 1998), biblical inerrancy (Wuthnow 2007), and certainty
in the existence of God (Johnson 1997; Sherkat 2008). Using a small sample of
Presbyterians, Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens (1993) found that higher levels of education, and
being a humanities or social science major in college, were associated with an array of
nontraditional beliefs. More recently, Reimer (2010) similarly found, using a sample of
church-going Protestants, that higher education, secular higher education, and exposure to
secular theories (Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, etc.) were all associated with more liberal
religious beliefs. And Schieman (2010) found that higher socioeconomic status (a variable
encompassing both education and income) was associated with decreased belief in a
personal god and decreased belief in divine control over human affairs.
In contrast with these studies, other recent research has found that college has only limited,
or even slightly conservative, effects on students’ religious beliefs. Based on interviews with
young adults a year after graduating from high school, Clydesdale (2007:59) found that
“faith’s role hardly alters at all” for most students during the first year of college, as students
put their beliefs into an “identity lockbox” and focus instead on management of daily life.
Smith (1998:163) similarly found, through interviews with evangelicals, that the vast
majority who had attended college said it had not made them doubt their religious beliefs. A
number of quantitative studies of college students have likewise found that strong pluralities
or a majority of students report no shifts in the self-rated importance of their religious beliefs
during college (Hurtado et al. 2007; Lee 2002b; Lee, Matzken, and Arthur 2004).
Thus, existing research on how college affects students’ beliefs is torn between those studies
that continue to find that college has a significant liberalizing effect, and those that argue
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that its impact is minimal or even protective. Yet limitations of this research make it difficult
to adjudicate between these two theories. Many qualitative studies rely on non-probability
samples of college students which, while suggestive, raise questions about how widespread
or representative their findings are, and do not speak to similarities or dissimilarities
between college students and their nonstudent counterparts. Many quantitative studies are
based on probability samples, but they are also cross-sectional and thus cannot adjudicate
whether differences in religious beliefs existed prior to college or emerged as a result of the
college experience itself. They also typically examine beliefs among adults who attended
college at different times and, in many cases, long ago. Moreover, very few studies
explicitly attempt to compare college students with those who do not attend college. In light
of these shortcomings, it is not surprising that reviews of the relevant literature regularly call
for more longitudinal studies of the religious commitments of young adults—both college
students and those who do not attend college (Barry et al. 2010; Hartley 2004; Mayrl and
Oeur 2009).
How College Affects Students: The Dimensions and Logic of Belief Liberalization
The proposition that college liberalizes students’ religious beliefs raises two related
questions: (1) What do we mean when we say that students’ beliefs have become more
liberal? And (2) On what grounds should we expect college to liberalize religious beliefs?
Seven Dimensions of Liberalization—As we elaborate below, higher education is
thought to liberalize students’ beliefs by exposing students to religious diversity,
encouraging cognitive development, and creating cognitive dissonance. These mechanisms
may act in concert to liberalize students’ beliefs along at least seven possible dimensions.
College students, relative to their nonstudent peers, may become (1) more unorthodox—or
less in step with the traditional teachings of their faith tradition; (2) more naturalistic—or
less likely to believe in divinely-orchestrated supernatural occurrences; (3) more uncertain
about their faith—or more likely to have doubts about whether their religion is true; (4)
more reserved—or less likely to believe it is alright for people to try to convert others; (5)
more inclusive—or more likely to believe that religions other than their own could be true;
(6) more individualistic—or more likely to grant individuals rather than institutions
authority in deciding what they should believe; and (7) more independent—or less tied to
institutional religion for their religious identity.1
Social Effects—A first mechanism thought to contribute to belief liberalization is the
“cultural broadening” that comes from exposure to people with different beliefs (Hoge et al.
1993:243). The experience of going to college potentially relocates students in a new
environment characterized by greater diversity of thought and practice. Theoretically, this
exposure to diverse points of view is thought to liberalize students’ beliefs by making them
more uncertain about their own preexisting faith commitments. This argument is grounded
in Peter Berger’s (1967) idea that religious belief requires a “plausibility structure” within
which beliefs can be taken for granted. Diversity of belief, according to this theory,
undermines the student’s plausibility structure, leading to increased doubt. In short, the
exposure to alternative religious beliefs is thought to cause students to question their own
beliefs (see also Astin et al. 2011:101–14).
Regular interaction with peers and faculty with diverse religious (and non-religious) beliefs
may have a second liberalizing effect: increased comfort with religious pluralism. Studies of
the general population typically find trends consistent with the argument that encounters
1This operationalization is most appropriate for predominantly Christian contexts, since in other traditions (e.g., Buddhism), less
tension would exist between some of these dimensions (e.g., inclusivity) and traditional beliefs.
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with religious diversity lead people to be more open to it (e.g., Merino 2010; Wuthnow
2007). And studies of racial diversity on college campuses indicate that having friends of
another race, and participating in activities that expose oneself to racial diversity, has
positive net effects on racial tolerance (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005). There have been far
fewer studies explicitly looking at how diverse encounters in education may impact college
students’ religious beliefs, but those that have are generally consistent with this hypothesis.
Bryant and Astin (2008) found that spiritual struggle (including questioning of one’s
religious beliefs) among college students was positively associated with increased
acceptance of people with diverse religious beliefs. More indirectly, Schwadel (2005) found
that more-educated churchgoing Protestants were more likely to favor a “subdued” role for
Christianity in politics, largely out of the belief that Christians should not impose their
religion on others. Thus, the cultural broadening brought about by exposure to diversity may
additionally lead students to become more open to people from other religious traditions.
At the same time, however, religious beliefs may be more proximately affected by
particularly salient social ties—relationships with parents, peer groups, and religious
communities. Parents act as a potential buttress for traditional beliefs among emerging
adults (Smith and Snell 2009). Close relationships with parents improve the
intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and practices, sustaining continuity in
religious behavior (Myers 1996). Some studies have shown that parental religiosity can
continue affecting religious beliefs into the college years: Those whose parents attended
church more regularly were more likely to retain traditional beliefs about God (Smith and
Snell 2009; Willits and Crider 1989).
While parents remain an important influence on emerging adults, peers take on an
increasingly important role among college students (Gunnoe and Moore 2002). More than
three-quarters of college students’ religious experiences and discussions are thought to take
place with their friends (Barry et al. 2010). Not surprisingly, several studies of college
students have found that peer groups play an important role in shaping students’ beliefs.
Students whose friends attend church with them are more likely to accept traditional
religious beliefs, with the impact being strongest if all of a student’s friends attend church
with her (Roberts, Koch, and Johnson 2001). Further, having a more religious peer group
has also been shown to correlate with more exclusivist religious beliefs (Becker 1977).
Living situation is also thought to impact religious beliefs, largely through differential
exposure to peers. Studies have shown that those who live at home are less likely to
disaffiliate from religion (Pascarella and Terenzini 1991), less likely to experience change in
their religious values (Hartley 2004), and more likely to increase their religious participation
(Hill 2009). Living in a residence hall, by contrast, has been associated with increased odds
of disaffiliation and increased openness to religious diversity (Pascarella and Terenzini
1991, 2005).
A final influence on students’ religious beliefs is the religious community in which they are
embedded. Active participation in congregations provides young adults with role models,
social networks, spiritual experiences, and regular exposure to religious beliefs that are
thought to reinforce their religious commitments (Smith 2003). These close-knit
communities may protect students’ beliefs; three recent studies (Astin et al. 2011; Reimer
2010; Schieman 2010) have found that the liberalizing effects of higher education are
mitigated or counteracted by religious service attendance and personal devotion.
In sum, because the religiously diverse college setting is thought to foster more uncertain
and inclusive beliefs, differences in college student connection to parents, religious peers,
and religious congregations may be important mediators of the effect of college on religious
change. Stronger parental relations, a greater amount of homophily in friendship networks,
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living at home, and attending services may all be associated with greater retention of
traditional beliefs.
Cognitive Effects—College is also thought to influence students’ religious beliefs
through cognitive effects, particularly cognitive development and dissonance. Colleges and
universities are specifically designed to improve students’ intellectual skills, and, not
surprisingly, college students manifest significantly higher levels of cognitive ability, in
terms of critical thinking skills and postformal reasoning, than those who do not attend
college (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005). The cognitive development that higher education
encourages, in turn, is thought to contribute to the emergence of more complex and inclusive
forms of belief by promoting rational thinking and opening the mind to the possibility of
multiple truths (Barry et al. 2010; Good and Willoughby 2008).
Further, cognitive development is thought to contribute to more individualistic and reflexive
forms of belief. According to James Fowler (1981), for instance, emerging adulthood is the
typical time for individuals to move from a “synthetic-conventional” faith, where beliefs are
traditional and largely determined by external sources of authority, to an “individuative-
reflective faith,” characterized by the rise of an “executive ego” that permits individuals to
reflect upon and select their own beliefs based on internal authority. As Fowler notes
(1981:179), the college experience (along with travel and moving away from home)
encourages the “relativization of [individuals’] inherited world views” and provides the
essential “critical distancing” needed to undergo the transition to an individuative-reflective
faith. Students’ religious beliefs do appear to become more individualistic and independent
during the college years (Arnett 2004; Wuthnow 2007). Lee (2002a) found that students
who reported changing their beliefs during college had developed a “contextualized self,”
viewing themselves as active agents in creating their own, independently-derived
spirituality. And several studies have found that college students appear skeptical and wary
of religious institutions, often preferring to speak of their own personal “spirituality” rather
than institutional “religion” (Arnett 2004; Cherry et al. 2001).
Nevertheless, although cognitive development may lead to more complex beliefs, it does not
follow that it must lead to more liberal religious beliefs, as the many examples of
sophisticated conservative theologies demonstrate (e.g., Barth 1968). It may be, therefore,
that the supposed cognitive development effect instead reflects exposure to a collegiate
curriculum developed to meet the liberal goals of modern American universities.
Accordingly, it may not be cognitive development per se, but rather cognitive dissonance
arising from exposure to religiously-problematic ideas, that can lead to liberalization. The
positivist approaches and secular assumptions of the natural and social sciences, in
particular, are often thought to challenge traditional religious beliefs (Ecklund, Park, and
Veliz 2008). In the humanities, too, history, philosophy, and religious studies courses may
more directly influence students to adopt less orthodox beliefs by exposing them to
Enlightenment thought, Higher Criticism, and liberal theology. Specific disciplines do
appear to have distinct influences on students. Humanities and social science majors are
more likely to hold nontraditional beliefs (Hoge et al. 1993), and exposure to secular
theories (such as those discussed in philosophy and sociology courses) was recently found to
be a strong predictor of decreased orthodoxy (Reimer 2010). In short, the cognitive effects
associated with higher education may make students’ religious beliefs more complex,
individualistic, and independent, and less orthodox.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The goal of this paper is to adjudicate between the two competing schools of thought on
how college affects students’ religious beliefs. Our primary research question is thus simply:
Mayrl and Uecker Page 5













Does attending college, net of other factors, cause students’ religious beliefs to become more
liberal? Secondarily, we also ask: Do social network and cognitive effects explain
differences between college students and non-attenders?
DATA
The data for this study come from the first and third waves of The National Survey of Youth
and Religion (NSYR). Wave 1 of the NSYR, conducted in 2002–2003, is a nationally
representative telephone, random-digit-dial survey of 3,290 English and Spanish-speaking
teenagers (ages 13–17) in all 50 United States. In Wave 3, conducted in 2007–2008, every
attempt was made to re-interview all English-speaking Wave 1 youth survey respondents,
who were by this time between the ages of 18 and 24. The Wave 3 survey instrument
replicated many of the questions asked in Wave 1. Of the eligible 3,282 Wave 1
respondents, 2,532 participated in the Wave 3 survey (including 13 partial cases), for a
Wave 3 completion rate of 77.1%.2 Because the NSYR was designed to capture the shape
and influence of religion and spirituality in the lives of American youth, it includes a wealth
of information about respondents’ religious beliefs at both waves, making it ideal for a study
of change in religious beliefs from adolescence to early adulthood.
MEASURES
Dependent Variables
We examine seven dichotomous dependent variables, one for each dimension of
liberalization explicated above. Because we are interested in liberalization, each variable is a
measure of change from what might be considered a traditional or conservative position to
what might be considered a progressive or liberal position. Thus, we restrict our samples to
young adults who held traditional positions as adolescents. The first dependent variable
measures a change in one’s belief in a personal god. Respondents were asked at both waves
whether they believed in God and, subsequently, what their view of God was. On this
second question, they could choose from four response categories: “God is a personal being
involved in the lives of people today,” “God created the world, but is not involved in the
world now,” “God is not personal, but something like a cosmic life force,” or “None of these
views.” Respondents who believed in a personal god at both waves are coded 0, and those
who believed in a personal god at Wave 1 but something other than a personal god (or did
not believe in a god at all) at Wave 3 are coded 1.
Our second dependent variable taps the loss of belief in supernatural occurrences.
Respondents were asked at both waves, “Do you believe in the possibility of divine miracles
from God?” Those who responded “definitely” at both waves are coded 0; those who
responded “definitely” at Wave 1 but “maybe,” “not at all,” or “don’t know” at Wave 3 are
coded 1.
As a measure of uncertainty, we created a variable gauging respondents’ increased doubts in
their religion between waves. At both waves, NSYR asked those who considered themselves
2Some details about sample attrition are merited here. Those who participated in the Wave 3 survey do differ from those who did not
in some respects. Respondents who dropped out were less likely to be female, White, mainline Protestant, Mormon, have a mother
with a college degree, have attended religious services at least weekly, and to say religion was at least very important in their daily
lives; and more likely to have been black Protestant or not religious. It is impossible for us to say exactly how this affects our
estimates, but we suspect we may slightly underestimate religious liberalization because of the strong associations among gender,
religiosity, and traditional belief maintenance. Still, this underestimation is unlikely to be large since the study dropouts comprise
under one-fourth of the original sample. Furthermore, we can think of no conceptual reason why the relationship between college
attendance and belief maintenance would vary for those who fell out of the sample; therefore, we do not believe sample attrition
affects our estimates in the multivariate tables. Detailed methodological information about the NSYR is available online at
www.youthandreligion.org.
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religious, “In the last year, how much, if at all, have you had doubts about whether your
religious beliefs are true? Have you had many doubts, some doubts, a few doubts, or no
doubts?” We restrict the sample here to respondents with the opportunity to increase their
doubt—those with no, few, or some doubts. Those who reported an equal or lesser amount
of doubt between waves are coded 0; those who reported in increase in doubt (e.g., from few
to many, from none to few) are coded 1. Those who disaffiliated from their religion between
waves were not asked this question at wave 3, and are excluded.
Our fourth dependent variable measures change in reservedness. Respondents were asked,
“Is it okay for religious people to try to convert other people to their faith, or should
everyone leave everyone else alone?” Those who indicated it is okay to convert others at
both waves are coded 0; those who said it was okay at Wave 1 but not at Wave 3 (including
those who “don’t know” at Wave 3) are coded 1.
To gauge change in religious inclusivity, we include a measure of whether the respondent no
longer believes only one religion is true, but instead that many religions may be true. At
Waves 1 and 3, respondents were asked, “Which of the following statements comes closest
to your own views about religion? Only one religion is true, many religions may be true, or
there is very little truth in any religion?” Respondents answering at both waves that only one
religion is true are coded 0; respondents who at Wave 1 said only one religion was true but
at Wave 3 said many could be true are coded 1.
Our sixth dependent variable measures change in religious individualism. At both waves,
respondents were asked, “Some people think that it is okay to pick and choose their religious
beliefs without having to accept the teachings of their religious faith as a whole. Do you
agree or disagree?” Those who disagreed with this at both waves are coded 0; those who
disagreed at Wave 1 but agreed at Wave 3 are coded 1.
Lastly, our measure of (institutional) religious independence is a measure of increasing
identification with the label “spiritual but not religious.” At both waves, NSYR asked,
“Some people say that they are ‘spiritual but not religious.’ How true or not would you say
that is of you: very true, somewhat true, or not true at all?” Similar to the uncertainty
measure, we restrict this sample to those with the opportunity to increase on this measure—
those who said at Wave 1 this description is either “not true at all” or “somewhat true” of
them. Those who stayed the same on this measure or identified less with it were coded 0;
those who increased their identification as “spiritual but not religious” are coded 1.
Key Independent Variable
Our key independent variable is a dichotomous measure of educational attainment.
Respondents who had ever attended a four-year college are coded 1; those who had never
attended a four-year college are coded 0. Respondents still enrolled in high school are
excluded from the analysis.3
Key Mediating Variables
We include a number of variables that measure the characteristics of respondents’ social
networks and their exposure to diversity. We include measures of the respondent’s relational
closeness to their mother and father at Wave 3. These variables range in value from “not
close at all” (coded 1) to “extremely close” (coded 6). Those who were not in contact with
their mother or father were coded 1 and a dummy variable for parent absence was included
3We experimented with other ways of coding this variable (details available from first author), but this simple dichotomous measure
of any exposure to four-year college yielded the most accurate, clear, and parsimonious findings.
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in the model. We also include a set of dummy variables tapping respondents’ living situation
at Wave 3. This variable is a set of four binary variables measuring whether respondents live
with their parents (reference group), another person’s home, their own place, or in group
quarters. We also include two measures that tap respondents’ religious networks. The first is
a measure of peer group religious homophily. NSYR asked respondents to identify up to five
close friends other than their parents. They then asked, “How many, if any, of these people
are similar to you in their beliefs about religion?” From this information, we created a
measure of the percentage of friends who shared religious beliefs. Those who reported zero
friends (n=6) are coded as 0. This variable ranges from 0–100. The second measure of
religious networks is a measure of the respondents’ Wave 3 religious service attendance.
This measure ranges from “never” (coded 0) to “more than once a week” (coded 5).
Importantly, we also control for each of these factors at Wave 1 (with the exception of living
situation, since almost all lived with parents or other family members). Thus, these
mediating variables can be interpreted as changes in social network factors.4
Control Variables
In addition to the controls for the Wave 1 mediating variables (maternal and paternal
closeness, proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, and religious service
attendance), we include a number of other sociodemographic and religious controls that may
co-vary with educational attainment and religious beliefs. Specifically, we control for Wave
1 gender (female=1), region of residence (South, Northeast, Midwest, West), race, mother’s
education, parents’ marital status, self-reported importance of religion, and religious
affiliation (following the RELTRAD classification). We also control for Wave 3 age, marital
status, and parenthood status. We also include dummy variables tapping mother and father
absence at Wave 1. For descriptive statistics of key measures, see Appendix A.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
We begin our analysis in Table 1 by reporting bivariate relationships among educational
attainment and change in religious beliefs. This gives a descriptive picture of the change
occurring. We then move to our multivariate analyses in Tables 2–8. Each table consists of
three logit regression models predicting each of the seven dependent variables. The first
models include the educational attainment variable and all the control variables. The second
models add the parental relationship, living situation, and friendship network variables. The
final model adds the respondents’ embeddedness in a religious community. This nested
modeling strategy allows us to examine how the mediating variables explain the relationship
between educational attainment and change in religious beliefs. All analyses apply the
longitudinal weight included in the NSYR data.
RESULTS
We begin with basic descriptive statistics for liberalizing shifts among the sample. Table 1
shows that most emerging adults do not experience significant liberalization in their
religious beliefs, irrespective of whether they attend college. On most measures, only about
25% to 35% of emerging adults experience liberalizing shifts. Further, there are only slight
variations between students and non-students on most measures.5 However, college students
do experience increased doubts about religion at a somewhat higher rate (30% versus 22%),
4Although a college’s religious affiliation has been shown to have important effects on students’ religious engagements (Astin et al.
2011; Hill 2009), we do not examine it here because of space limitations. We plan to address this question elsewhere.
5Those with liberal religious beliefs do not appear to be any more likely to attend college in the first place. Supplementary analyses
revealed that, with the exception of individualistic beliefs, college actually appears to be attracting students with slightly more
conservative religious beliefs.
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while non-students report decreased belief in a personal god (29% versus 23%) and
increased opposition to conversion attempts (38% versus 32%) at higher rates.
Table 2 examines the impact of college attendance on belief in a personal god. Model 1
reveals that, contrary to conventional wisdom, college students are less likely to stop
believing in a personal god than non-students. This difference remains marginally
significant even when network variables are accounted for in Model 2. Paternal closeness,
living in group quarters, and peer homophily are all negatively associated with the
development of unorthodox beliefs about God. In Model 3, however, religious service
attendance is strongly negatively associated with the development of liberal conceptions of
God, and introducing it appears to completely mediate the effect of college attendance.
Religious peer groups, paternal closeness, and group living continue to have significant
direct effects in this model.
Table 3 examines the impact of college attendance on supernatural beliefs. Model 1 shows
that college attendance appears to have no impact on whether an emerging adult stops
believing in miracles. The addition of network variables in Model 2 does not change this
finding, but it does indicate that paternal and maternal closeness and peer homophily
correlate negatively with the development of naturalistic beliefs, while living independently
correlates positively. Model 3 demonstrates that religious service attendance is strongly
negatively associated with decreased belief in miracles, but that paternal relationship and
peer homophily continue to exert a negative influence on belief liberalization. College
attendance has no significant effect on belief in miracles in any model.
Table 4 examines the impact of college attendance on religious doubt. Model 1 shows that
college students are significantly more likely to experience increased doubts about religion
than are non-students. Model 2 reveals that those with more religiously similar friends are
less likely to develop religious doubts, as are those who have closer relationships with their
father. These social ties eliminate the significance of college attendance. However, the
positive effect of college attendance becomes marginally significant again in Model 3, once
religious service attendance is accounted for. College students are more likely to entertain
increased doubts than non-attenders, an association that appears to be explained primarily—
though not entirely—by social network factors.6
Table 5 examines the impact of college attendance on religious reservedness. Model 1
indicates that college students are considerably less likely to develop the belief that
conversion efforts are unacceptable. When the relationship variables are introduced in
Model 2, however, the significance of this effect becomes marginal, suggesting that paternal
closeness and peer homophily mediate the impact of college attendance. Model 3 indicates
that religious service attendance is strongly negatively associated with development of
opposition to conversion, further reduces the effect of college attendance on beliefs about
conversion, and appears to mediate all of the significant effect of religious peer groups.
Closer paternal relationships continue to be associated with reservedness in Model 3.
Table 6 examines the impact of college attendance on religious inclusivity. Model 1
indicates that college attendance has no effect on inclusive views of religious truth, a finding
that continues across all models. In Model 2, peer group homophily is negatively associated
with the development of inclusive beliefs, but the other network variables are insignificant.
When religious attendance is added in Model 3, the model shows that attendance is highly
6Interestingly, when we include those who disaffiliated from religion altogether as having increased their doubts, there is no effect of
college attendance in any model. This comports with other findings (e.g., Uecker et al. 2007) that suggest college attenders are less
likely to disaffiliate from religion than non-attenders. We believe disaffiliation is a distinct process from doubting, however, and thus
do not include these respondents in our main analysis.
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negatively associated with the belief that multiple religions may be true, and the effect of
peer homophily becomes marginally significant, suggesting that participation in a religious
community may explain much of the peer homophily effect.
Table 7 examines the impact of college attendance on religious individualism. Model 1
indicates that college students are no more likely to come to believe that it is OK to pick and
choose religious beliefs, and this finding holds across all models. Model 2 shows that
network factors are more predictive of this outcome. Peer homophily has a significant
negative effect on the adoption of individualistic beliefs, as do living in another person’s
home or in group quarters. Living alone, by contrast, has a marginally significant positive
effect. Model 3 demonstrates that religious service attendance is, again, strongly negatively
associated with the development of individualistic beliefs. Attendance appears to mediate
the independent living effect, but not those of peer homophily or the effects of living in
another person’s home or in group quarters. College continues to have no effect on
propensity to approve of picking and choosing.
Finally, Table 8 examines the impact of college attendance on religious independence.
College attendance is not significantly correlated with becoming more likely to identify as
“spiritual but not religious” in any of the models, nor are any of the network variables when
added in Models 2. Heightened religious service attendance, however, is negatively
associated with religious independence, a finding not particularly surprising given the
common equation of religious service attendance and being religious.
Interaction Effects
In Table 9, we explore variations by religious tradition. These models are parallel to those in
Tables 2–8 but include an education-religious tradition multiplicative interaction term. In the
interest of space, we do not display all the odds ratios—which are similar to those in the
previous tables—just the marginal effect of educational exposure for Wave 1 adherents to
each religious group. Significant interaction terms among the groups are denoted with
superscript letters. Educational effects for mainline Protestants appear to be distinct from
some other groups—especially conservative Protestants and Catholics—when it comes to
developing unorthodox, naturalistic, inclusive, reserved, and individualistic beliefs. Though
the odds ratios for college attendance among mainline Protestants are not significant for
discontinued belief in a personal god and only significant or marginally significant in some
models for these other outcomes, the odds ratios are large and the cell sizes small,
suggesting that a larger sample may reveal positive effects of college attendance for
mainline Protestants on these measures. In many instances, those without any religious
affiliation at Wave 1 also appear to liberalize religiously as the result of their college
experience. Again, however, small cell sizes impede statistical significance among this
group. Finally, attending four-year college may deter liberalization among conservative
Protestants on additional outcomes. College attendance has a marginally significant negative
effect on naturalistic beliefs in the first two models and a strong and consistent negative
effect on reservedness and religious individualism across models, though some of the
educational effect for these latter outcomes is mediated by social network factors.
DISCUSSION
Several key findings emerge from these results. First, and most importantly, contrary to
longstanding scholarly wisdom, attending college appears to have no liberalizing effect on
most dimensions of religious belief. In fact, on some measures, college students appear to
liberalize less than those who never attended college. College students are less likely to stop
believing in a personal god and less likely to stop believing in the propriety of conversion
attempts. On the other hand, they are more likely to develop doubts about their religious
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beliefs. In the main, however, the effect of college on students’ religious beliefs appears to
be extremely weak. Although significant minorities of emerging adults become more liberal
in their religious beliefs, college itself does not appear to be the culprit. College students do
not liberalize any more than those who do not go to college.7
In fact, the case for the null (and perhaps protective) effects of college on traditional
religious belief is even stronger than it appears from the results presented above. In
supplementary analyses (not shown), college attendance also failed to predict differences on
six other variables measuring religious beliefs. College students are also no more likely than
non-students to stop believing in a judgment day, stop believing in an afterlife, stop
believing in angels, stop believing in demons (except in the final two models, where social
networks appear to suppress a positive effect of college attendance), become more uncertain
about the existence of God, or abandon the belief that active congregational participation is a
necessary aspect of being religious. Thus, on ten out of thirteen possible beliefs, attending
college shows no net liberalizing effect before accounting for social networks; on two
others, college appears to support traditional beliefs; on only one outcome—increased
religious doubt—does college appear to undermine traditional religious belief. In the debate
over how college influences religious beliefs, this study overwhelmingly supports those who
claim that its influence is largely negligible, and perhaps even somewhat protective of
traditional religious belief.
Second, to the extent that college does affect students’ beliefs, this study finds that much of
that effect can be explained by the social contexts in which students are embedded. Net of
parental relationships, living situation, peer groups, and religious attendance, college
appears to have a significant effect only on belief in demons, and that appears to be a case of
suppression rather than mediation. The positive effect of college on religious doubting is
mostly explained by social networks (though it is marginally significant in the final model),
and the conservative effect of college on beliefs in a personal god and the propriety of
conversion appear to be entirely mediated by these social variables. This indicates that, in
addition to being generally weak, college’s effect on religious belief is fragmented, partial,
and largely explained by social ties.
Across most measures, the most consistent predictors of increased liberalization are not
college attendance, but rather how often one attends religious services and what proportion
of one’s friends are coreligionists. On nearly every measure, those whose friendship circles
were less religiously diverse and those who attended services more regularly were less likely
to develop more liberal beliefs. Of these, service attendance appears to be the more
powerful. Service attendance was strongly negatively correlated with belief liberalization on
all seven measures. Peer homophily also correlated significantly in the final models on four
of the seven measures (and marginally so on a fifth), after controlling for religious
attendance.
Parental relationships also predicted the likelihood of belief liberalization.8 A close paternal
relationship appears to discourage the development of an impersonal conception of God, the
abandonment of belief in miracles, increased doubts about religion, and increased religious
reservedness. It may be that those with closer paternal relationships are simply more
7Although our focus is on belief change, we also analyzed changes in service attendance and importance of faith. Consistent with
other research (Smith and Snell 2009; Uecker et al. 2007), we found that college protects against attendance declines. However, we
did not find any significant effect of college on declines in religious salience.
8We likely underestimate the effect of parental relationships since there is no reason to assume that all parents hold traditional beliefs
and should buffer their offspring from liberalization. Unfortunately, the NSYR dataset has data on only one parent and therefore does
not permit us to account for the potential interaction between mother and father religiosity and parent-child relationships in these
models.
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comfortable with traditional forms of authority, such as those emphasized in orthodox
Christian beliefs (Lakoff 2002). On the other hand, since studies have shown that religious
fathers tend to be more involved in family life and parenting than those who are less
religious (Wilcox 2002), these findings may instead indicate that children with closer
paternal relationships were raised by more devout parents, and thus more effectively
socialized into their religious beliefs.
Perhaps surprisingly, college appears to have a somewhat stronger protective effect on
conservative Protestant students’ beliefs. For most beliefs, college has the same effect
among conservative Protestants as it has among all young adults, but conservative
Protestants do liberalize less on two additional dimensions of belief: reservedness and
naturalism, though the difference on the latter is only marginally significant. Mainline
Protestant students, by contrast, appear more likely to liberalize on some measures. It may
be that certain cultural features of the religious traditions themselves predispose mainline
and conservative Protestant students to be more or less open to liberal conceptions of
religion. Alternatively, it may be that opportunities for religious participation and
networking on campus vary among groups, leading to divergent socializing patterns.
Although mainline campus ministries have declined in recent years, evangelical ministries
have expanded rapidly (Schmalzbauer 2007), and these may help evangelical students
sustain traditional religious beliefs.
Turning to the two mechanisms of collegiate influence, this study suggests that, on religious
matters, at least, the “cultural broadening” effect of college may be less than is typically
thought. While college may expose students to religious diversity, and while this exposure
may lead to liberalization in some students, there are very few indications that this exposure
leads to markedly different outcomes among students and non-attenders. To be sure, the
relationship between religious diversity and religious belief is complicated. The effect of
college on increased doubt suggests that exposure to new beliefs and ideas may indeed lead
students to understand their faith in more relativistic terms than nonstudents. However, this
statement must be qualified, since, generally speaking, college students are also less likely to
become more religiously reserved or inclusive than their nonstudent counterparts.
What might account for these weak effects? It may be that cultural broadening occurs
earlier, in high school, thanks to increased diversity in the general population. The observed
negative effect of age on liberalization on many of these outcomes lends credence to this
view. Or it may be that college campuses are no longer substantially more diverse than the
social worlds outside their borders. In additional analyses (not shown), we found that the
friendship circles of those who attended college were actually less religiously diverse than
those of nonattenders, but the differences were neither substantively nor statistically
significant. This may suggest that cultural broadening occurs in roughly equivalent amounts
both inside and outside the college setting.
More likely, we believe, in light of our findings on the effect of network variables, is that
college students are self-segregating within the college setting. Moral worldviews have a
strong independent effect on social network composition (Vaisey and Lizardo 2010). It
seems likely that this effect would be quite strong in the college setting, where old social
networks are typically disrupted and a wide variety of potential friendship and associational
networks are available to students. Our results suggest that, for many students, the smaller
social worlds into which they choose to enter may provide essential supports for the
preservation of traditional beliefs, by reducing exposure to religious diversity, providing
spaces in which religion can be safely ignored, or providing countervailing supports that
allow students to retain their beliefs amidst diversity. The dynamics of religious belief, in
other words, may have substantial parallels to the dynamics of religious practice and
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disaffiliation as reported in other studies (e.g., Hill 2009; Uecker et al. 2007). Self-
segregation of students into “moral communities” on campus may effectively undercut any
“cultural broadening” effect of college, and thus any additional propensity for religious
liberalization.
Finally, our study raises doubts about the proposed cognitive pathways to liberalization.
Although our dataset does not contain measures that would permit us to directly assess these
cognitive processes, we did find that—with the single, marginal exception of doubt—college
students are no more likely than nonstudents to experience belief liberalization once social
aspects are controlled, suggesting cognitive effects of college attendance are minimal. Our
indirect measures may conceal differences among students associated with their choice of
major or other academic experiences (e.g., Reimer 2010). Alternately, it may indicate that
students can successfully compartmentalize their religious beliefs from other areas. Pancer
and colleagues (1995) found that more traditional religious students tended to have similar
levels of complexity in thinking about nonreligious issues as less traditional students, but
much less complex thinking about religious issues. Our data cannot speak to either of these
particular hypotheses, but they do raise a set of questions for further research.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies of the relationship between higher education and religious belief are torn
between those finding a liberalizing effect, and those finding little effect. Our study, whose
research design overcomes many of the methodological limitations of previous studies,
provides overwhelming evidence in favor of those finding minimal impact. It also illustrates
the centrality of social factors in mediating the relationship between college attendance and
change in religious beliefs when differences do exist.
While contributing to the resolution of this debate, our study also suggests several avenues
for future research. First, while we find that attending college does not make emerging
adults more likely to develop liberal beliefs, this finding remains in tension with studies of
the broader population, which regularly find education to be associated with less orthodox
religious beliefs (e.g., Petersen 1994; Sherkat 1998; Wuthnow 2007). There are at least two
alternative explanations to a general education effect that merit investigation. First, the
association of education and religious liberalism may be a legacy of a previous era in which
higher education acted more strongly to liberalize students’ beliefs. Some scholars have
indeed suggested that there may be important period or cohort effects on the college-belief
relationship (Clydesdale 2007), but to our knowledge this possibility has not been
systematically assessed. Second, college students may be more likely to differentially
associate with those with more liberal religious beliefs after college, as the result of the
higher-status social networks and economic groupings into which a college degree provides
entrée (Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum 2008). Future analyses of the general population
should consider these and other potential explanations, by explicitly examining how cohort
and network effects may interact with educational attainment to explain religious
liberalization.
Second, one of the more perplexing findings of this study is that college students appear less
likely to liberalize on measures of orthodoxy and reservedness than nonstudents. This
finding obviously has implications for how we understand the collegiate environment, and
how it might or might not differ from other social settings. One possible explanation is that
the broader culture is now substantially more like the college setting in terms of the ideas
and people it exposes people to. Nonstudents may be just as likely to imbibe more liberal
cultural and religious ideas, thanks to the triumph of liberal Protestantism in shaping the
broader culture (Smith and Snell 2009). Alternatively, the dominant type of campus culture
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may have changed into one that is more protective of traditional religious beliefs than other
contexts, thanks to norms of religious tolerance and/or faculty reluctance to engage with
students’ religious beliefs (Cherry et al. 2001; Nash 2001; Uecker et al. 2007). Yet the
extent to which either of these theories is true remains unclear. Arriving at a more
satisfactory understanding of how higher education compares with noncollege settings will
require at least three additional types of research: more studies of nonstudent populations,
including studies of their lived experience and religious beliefs; closer examination of the
religious communities that students enter into, as well as the dynamics of religion within
student peer networks; and additional investigations into the dynamics of religion on college
campuses, both contemporary and historical.
In sum, college students are no more likely to develop more liberal religious beliefs than
those who do not attend. In some cases, college students actually appear more likely to
retain their initial beliefs than nonstudents. These findings indicate that college’s effect on
students’ religious beliefs is both weak and fragmented. Further, change in religious beliefs
appears instead to be more strongly associated with network effects, particularly parental
relationships, the proportion of friends who are coreligionists, and service attendance. The
importance of these social factors suggests both the validity and the limitations of the
“cultural broadening” theory of religious liberalization on college campuses. They also
suggest that the multiplicity of social worlds on college campuses, where students join
together into innumerable “moral communities,” may help to sustain specific religious
beliefs, not only religious affiliation, salience, or practice as previous studies had indicated.
Appendix A
Descriptive Statistics of Key Study Variables
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4.79/1.31 4.84/1.31 4.88/1.28 4.82/1.27 4.78/1.25 4.78/1.34 4.83/1.28 1–6
Closeness to
father, W3
3.70/1.80 3.68/1.82 3.77/1.78 3.70/1.79 3.70/1.72 3.59/1.80 3.63/1.80 1–6
Mother absent, W3 .05 .05 .05 .04 .04 .05 .05 0, 1
Father absent, W3 .22 .22 .21 .22 .17 .23 .23 0, 1
Lives with parents,
W3




.07 .08 .07 .07 .06 .07 .07 0, 1
Lives in own
place, W3
.37 .36 .37 .39 .36 .37 .38 0, 1
Lives in group
quarters, W3





63.76/33.11 65.32/33.36 65.38/32.92 64.02/33.21 69.12/31.16 65.68/33.21 62.60/33.96 0–100
Religious service
attendance, W3
2.35/1.99 2.50/2.00 2.72/1.90 2.43/2.01 3.16/1.92 2.38/2.01 2.06/1.97 0–5
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Table 1









No longer believes in personal God 25.4 23.2 29.1
No longer believes in miracles 23.5 23.4 23.6
Has increased doubts about religion 27.0 29.7 21.5
No longer believes it is OK to convert others 34.4 32.3 38.3
No longer believes it is not OK to pick and choose religious beliefs 42.8 41.8 44.3
No longer believes only one religion is true 34.3 32.9 36.9
Has become more “spiritual but not religious” 33.1 32.0 35.0
Note: Percentages are column percentages.
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Table 2
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting No Longer Believes in Personal God
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .70* .73† .87
Closeness to mother, W3 .88 .90
Closeness to father, W3 .76** .77**
Lives in another person’s home, W3 .70 .66
Lives in own place, W3 .92 .73
Lives in group quarters, W3 .63* .62*
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99*** .99**
Religious service attendance, W3 .68***
Female, W1 .41*** .39*** .35***
Lived in Northeast, W1 1.83** 1.83* 1.89*
Lived in Midwest, W1 1.32 1.23 1.33
Lived in West, W1 1.62* 1.65* 1.74*
Age, W3 .83** .84* .83**
Black, W1 .65 .65 .65
Hispanic, W1 .61† .57* .61†
Asian, W1 .44 .35† .30
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 .70 .72 .59
Mother had college degree, W1 1.12 1.13 1.24
Parents not broken up, W1 .95 .97 1.07
Religious service attendance, W1 .86** .86** .95
Importance of religion, W1 .79* .78* .89
Mainline Protestant, W1 2.47*** 2.56*** 1.92**
Black Protestant, W1 1.16 1.31 1.40
Catholic, W1 1.45† 1.53* 1.31
Jewish, W1 1.89 1.89 1.60
Mormon, W1 .26* .24* .24*
No religion, W1 1.21 1.32 1.43
Other religion, W1 2.07 2.13 2.53
Ever married, W3 1.38 1.49 1.73
Has child living with them, W3 .61 .61 .60
Closeness to mother, W1 .89 .92 .90
Closeness to father, W1 .99 1.14 1.15
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 .99** .99* .99*























Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 3
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting No Longer Believes in Miracles
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .90 .86 1.04
Closeness to mother, W3 .84* .87
Closeness to father, W3 .72*** .72**
Lives in another person’s home, W3 .97 .73
Lives in own place, W3 1.68* 1.28
Lives in group quarters, W3 1.13 1.23
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99*** .99**
Religious service attendance, W3 .61***
Female, W1 .93 .87 .77
Lived in Northeast, W1 1.73* 1.73* 1.71
Lived in Midwest, W1 1.35 1.35 1.53†
Lived in West, W1 1.08 1.12 1.28
Age, W3 .86* .86† .87†
Black, W1 .41* .45† .48†
Hispanic, W1 1.12 1.17 1.53
Asian, W1 .63 .67 .59
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 .81 .87 .57
Mother had college degree, W1 1.42† 1.25 1.38
Parents not broken up, W1 .90 .90 1.07
Religious service attendance, W1 .85** .85** .95
Importance of religion, W1 .65*** .63*** .71**
Mainline Protestant, W1 1.82* 1.83* 1.39
Black Protestant, W1 1.79 1.93 2.18
Catholic, W1 1.27 1.38 1.20
Jewish, W1 2.35 2.29 2.43
Mormon, W1 .61 .72 1.10
No religion, W1 1.31 1.38 1.39
Other religion, W1 2.96† 3.08† 2.97
Ever married, W3 .93 .81 1.00
Has child living with them, W3 .36* .32** .29**
Closeness to mother, W1 .92 1.02 .99
Closeness to father, W1 1.02 1.19† 1.21†
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 1.00 1.00 1.00























Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 4
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting Increased Doubts about Religion
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 1.55* 1.38 1.44†
Closeness to mother, W3 1.06 1.06
Closeness to father, W3 .78** .78**
Lives in another person’s home, W3 .67 .63
Lives in own place, W3 1.36 1.26
Lives in group quarters, W3 1.33 1.32
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99*** .99***
Religious service attendance, W3 .89*
Female, W1 .77 .75† .74†
Lived in Northeast, W1 1.53† 1.54† 1.50
Lived in Midwest, W1 .93 .92 .93
Lived in West, W1 1.39 1.40 1.43
Age, W3 .88* .89† .89†
Black, W1 .54 .53 .56
Hispanic, W1 1.02 1.02 1.07
Asian, W1 .25 .26 .28
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 1.03 1.14 1.12
Mother had college degree, W1 .85 .82 .84
Parents not broken up, W1 1.04 1.02 1.05
Religious service attendance, W1 .98 .97 1.00
Importance of religion, W1 1.07 1.10 1.15
Mainline Protestant, W1 1.16 1.08 .98
Black Protestant, W1 .85 .87 .83
Catholic, W1 .89 .89 .85
Jewish, W1 1.43 1.11 1.05
Mormon, W1 .38* .39* .41†
No religion, W1 3.50† 3.48† 3.84†
Other religion, W1 1.25 1.12 1.09
Ever married, W3 .86 .81 .86
Has child living with them, W3 .68 .70 .70
Closeness to mother, W1 1.16 1.14 1.14
Closeness to father, W1 .99 1.15 1.15
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 1.00 1.00 1.00
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†
p < .10
Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 5
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting No Longer Believes It Is OK to Convert Others
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .69* .70† .79
Closeness to mother, W3 .94 .99
Closeness to father, W3 .83* .83*
Lives in another person’s home, W3 1.05 1.00
Lives in own place, W3 1.28 1.10
Lives in group quarters, W3 .88 .94
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99* 1.00
Religious service attendance, W3 .74***
Female, W1 1.79** 1.75** 1.74**
Lived in Northeast, W1 1.15 1.20 1.21
Lived in Midwest, W1 .97 .95 1.00
Lived in West, W1 1.11 1.13 1.13
Age, W3 .91 .90 .91
Black, W1 .30** .35** .42*
Hispanic, W1 1.28 1.28 1.38
Asian, W1 .44 .36 .29
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 1.25 1..35 1.31
Mother had college degree, W1 1.17 1.13 1.20
Parents not broken up, W1 .78 .82 .93
Religious service attendance, W1 .80*** .80*** .88*
Importance of religion, W1 .80* .80* .86
Mainline Protestant, W1 2.37*** 2.35** 1.98**
Black Protestant, W1 3.09* 2.90* 2.62*
Catholic, W1 2.83*** 2.92*** 2.60***
Jewish, W1 2.17 2.32 1.58
Mormon, W1 .17* .17* .22*
No religion, W1 1.01 .94 1.00
Other religion, W1 1.65 1.81 1.88
Ever married, W3 1.49 1.55 2.04†
Has child living with them, W3 .69 .69 .72
Closeness to mother, W1 1.09 1.11 1.07
Closeness to father, W1 1.04 1.16† 1.19†
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 1.00 1.00 1.00























Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 6
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting No Longer Believes Only One Religion Is True
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .86 .89 1.11
Closeness to mother, W3 1.13 1.25
Closeness to father, W3 .89 .91
Lives in another person’s home, W3 1.03 .72
Lives in own place, W3 1.33 .79
Lives in group quarters, W3 .75 .63
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99* .99†
Religious service attendance, W3 .62***
Female, W1 1.58† 1.53† 1.45
Lived in Northeast, W1 .69 .66 .53†
Lived in Midwest, W1 .82 .90 .84
Lived in West, W1 .54† .54† .48†
Age, W3 .86† .83† .79*
Black, W1 .24* .24* .16**
Hispanic, W1 .73 .78 .77
Asian, W1 1.63 1.82 2.77
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 .22* .23* .17**
Mother had college degree, W1 1.00 1.05 1.22
Parents not broken up, W1 .57* .60† .81
Religious service attendance, W1 .98 .98 1.13
Importance of religion, W1 .66** .66** .78
Mainline Protestant, W1 3.61** 3.39** 2.84**
Black Protestant, W1 4.74** 5.27** 6.70**
Catholic, W1 6.85*** 7.38*** 8.06***
Jewish, W1 ––– ––– –––
Mormon, W1 .98 .99 1.58
No religion, W1 12.09* 12.71* 14.94**
Other religion, W1 1.95 2.08 3.35
Ever married, W3 .47† .44† .62
Has child living with them, W3 .94 .94 1.50
Closeness to mother, W1 .93 .89 .87
Closeness to father, W1 .93 1.03 1.02
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 .99** .99* .99*























Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 7
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting No Longer Believes It Is Not OK to Pick and Choose
Religious Beliefs
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .81 .82 .90
Closeness to mother, W3 .90 .92
Closeness to father, W3 .90 .93
Lives in another person’s home, W3 .51* .48*
Lives in own place, W3 1.40† 1.21
Lives in group quarters, W3 .62* .62*
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 .99*** .99**
Religious service attendance, W3 .79***
Female, W1 .92 .90 .90
Lived in Northeast, W1 .97 1.14 1.12
Lived in Midwest, W1 1.03 1.04 1.08
Lived in West, W1 1.00 .97 1.01
Age, W3 1.01 .98 .98
Black, W1 .38** .40* .46*
Hispanic, W1 .60† .64 .70
Asian, W1 2.10 2.10 2.28
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 1.08 1.11 1.01
Mother had college degree, W1 1.37† 1.39† 1.50*
Parents not broken up, W1 .85 .83 .87
Religious service attendance, W1 .99 .98 1.05
Importance of religion, W1 .84* .86† .93
Mainline Protestant, W1 1.94* 1.73* 1.53
Black Protestant, W1 2.62* 2.87** 2.57*
Catholic, W1 2.52*** 2.73*** 2.47***
Jewish, W1 1.32 1.08 1.24
Mormon, W1 .57 .62 .72
No religion, W1 2.00† 2.05† 1.91†
Other religion, W1 .79 .79 .76
Ever married, W3 1.42 1.23 1.37
Has child living with them, W3 .90 .84 .92
Closeness to mother, W1 .96 1.02 1.04
Closeness to father, W1 1.00 1.04 1.06
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 .99† 1.00 1.00























Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 8
Odds Ratios From Logit Regression Models Predicting “Spiritual but Not Religious” More True Now
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ever attended four-year college, W3 .94 .93 .99
Closeness to mother, W3 1.04 1.06
Closeness to father, W3 .98 .99
Lives in another person’s home, W3 .96 .92
Lives in own place, W3 1.07 .97
Lives in group quarters, W3 .94 .96
Percentage of friends who share religious beliefs, W3 1.00 1.00
Religious service attendance, W3 .83***
Female, W1 .82 .81† .80†
Lived in Northeast, W1 .96 .99 .97
Lived in Midwest, W1 .89 .90 .91
Lived in West, W1 .97 1.00 1.02
Age, W3 1.08 1.07 1.07
Black, W1 .54* .56* .62†
Hispanic, W1 .94 .93 1.02
Asian, W1 .98 .96 1.01
Other/Indeterminable race, W1 .96 1.00 .98
Mother had college degree, W1 .80 .81 .83
Parents not broken up, W1 .82 .79† .82
Religious service attendance, W1 .98 .99 1.04
Importance of religion, W1 1.14† 1.14† 1.23**
Mainline Protestant, W1 1.25 1.22 1.09
Black Protestant, W1 1.92* 1.88* 1.81†
Catholic, W1 1.18 1.16 1.06
Jewish, W1 1.25 1.28 1.18
Mormon, W1 .57 .54 .63
No religion, W1 1.20 1.21 1.20
Other religion, W1 1.42 1.34 1.33
Ever married, W3 .84 .84 .94
Has child living with them, W3 1.28 1.28 1.30
Closeness to mother, W1 1.03 1.00 .99
Closeness to father, W1 .96 .97 .98
Proportion of friends who share religious beliefs, W1 1.00 1.00 1.00
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†
p < .10
Models also contain a control for indeterminable religious tradition at Wave 1 and mother and father absence at Waves 1 and 3. Reference
categories are living with parents, lived in South, White, and conservative Protestant.
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Table 9
Marginal Effect of Education (Odds Ratios) for Respondents in Different Religious Traditions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A. No longer believes in personal God
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .63†a .64†b .83 a
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 1.79 a,j 2.06 b, k,l 2.01 a,j
College effect for W1 black Protestant .62 .76 .80
College effect for W1 Catholic .47*j, o .46*k, o .58 j, p
College effect for W1 no religion 1.57 o 1.69 o 2.22 p
College effect for W1 other religions .56 .59 l .62
Panel B. No longer believes in miracles
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .62† .57†a .76
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 1.44 1.57 a 1.76
College effect for W1 black Protestant .98 1.02 1.13
College effect for W1 Catholic 1.33 1.24 1.33
College effect for W1 no religion 1.34 1.43 1.87
College effect for W1 other religions .71 .67 .88
Panel C. Increased doubts about religion
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant 1.75* 1.58 1.70†
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant .95 .83 .85
College effect for W1 black Protestant 1.41 1.30 1.39
College effect for W1 Catholic 1.53 1.26 1.28
College effect for W1 no religion 1.57 1.34 1.45
College effect for W1 other religions 1.51 1.57 1.57
Panel D. No longer believes it is OK to convert others
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .47** .46**a .53*
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 1.04 1.17 a 1.16
College effect for W1 black Protestant .87 .89 .90
College effect for W1 Catholic .70 .70 .88
College effect for W1 no religion 1.12 1.05 1.14
College effect for W1 other religions 1.00 1.09 1.27
Panel E. No longer believes only one religion is true
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .79 .83 1.24
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 2.26 2.71 g 4.88*h, i
College effect for W1 black Protestant .49 .51 g .49 h
College effect for W1 Catholic 1.15 .96 .76 i
College effect for W1 no religion .11 .06 .37
College effect for W1 other religions .98 1.17 .80
Panel F. No longer believes it is not OK to pick and choose religious beliefs
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .43**c, d, f .45**c, d, f .52*b, d, f
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 2.27 c, l 2.53†c, g, m 2.18 b,l
College effect for W1 black Protestant .79 n .71 g, n .72 n
College effect for W1 Catholic 1.49 d 1.57 d, q 1.73 d, q
College effect for W1 no religion 2.60†f, n, r 2.49 f, n, r 2.63†f, n, r
College effect for W1 other religions .57 l, r .55 m, q, r .59 l, o, r
Panel G. “Spiritual but not religious” more true now
College effect for W1 conservative Protestant .96 .95 1.06
College effect for W1 mainline Protestant 1.01 .97 .98
College effect for W1 black Protestant .83 .85 .92
College effect for W1 Catholic 1.10 1.09 1.17
College effect for W1 no religion .65 .61 .61









Models and Ns are identical to those in previous tables, except LDS and Jewish respondents are grouped with the “other religion” category due to
small cell sizes in interactions.
a
Conservative Protestant X Mainline Protestant interaction term significant at p < .10
b
Conservative Protestant X Mainline Protestant interaction term significant at p < .05
c
Conservative Protestant X Mainline Protestant interaction term significant at p < .01
d
Conservative Protestant X Catholic interaction term significant at p < .01
e
Conservative Protestant X Catholic interaction term significant at p < .05
f
Conservative Protestant X No religion interaction term significant at p < .01
g
Mainline Protestant X Black Protestant interaction term significant at p < .10
h
Mainline Protestant X Black Protestant interaction term significant at p < .05
i
Mainline Protestant X Catholic interaction term significant at p < .10
j
Mainline Protestant X Catholic interaction term significant at p < .05
k
Mainline Protestant X Catholic interaction term significant at p <. 01
l
Mainline Protestant X Other religion interaction term significant at p < .10
m
Mainline Protestant X Other religion interaction term significant at p < .05
n
Black Protestant X No religion interaction term significant at p < .10
o
Catholic X No religion interaction term significant at p < .10
p
Catholic X No religion interaction term significant at p < .05
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q
Catholic X Other religion interaction term significant at p < .10
r
No religion X Other religion interaction term significant at p < .05
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